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I. Nature of the Case 
Claimant/Appellant, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
LuAnn Shubert ("Claimant"), represents herself. 
Respondents/Defendants, Employer Macy's and its Surety, Liberty Insurance Corporation 
("Defendant/Surety''), are represented by Kent W. Day of Meridian, Idaho. 
This matter was heard on November 13, 2012, in Boise, Idaho, before Industrial 
Commission Referee Michael E. Powers. On June 19, 2013, the Commission issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations ("the Decision") in this matter. A.R., p. 6-25. 
On July 9, 2013, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration. A.R., p. 27. On July 19, 
2013, Defendant/Employer filed their response to Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration. A.R., p. 
33. On August 16, 2013, the Commission issued its Order Denying Reconsideration. A.R., p. 38. 
On September 27, 2013, Claimant filed her Notice of Appeal with the Commission. A.R., p. 43. On 
October 18, 2013, Claimant filed her Notice of Appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court. A.R., p. 48. 
On December 13, 2013, the Industrial Commission filed the Certification and Completion of 
the Record. A.R., p. 52-53. 
On July 8, 2014, Claimant filed an Objection to Record. A.R., p. 56. Defendants did not file 
a response. Claimant stated that the agency record was incomplete and that it should be augmented 
to include the following exhibits from hearing: Claimant's Exhibit D, Claimant's fully favorable 
Social Security Administration decision and Claimant's Exhibit E, Claimant's personal testimonies. 
A.R., p. 54. On February 14, 2014, the Industrial Commission filed an Order granting Claimant's 
Request to Augment the Agency Record. A.R., p. 56. 
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On February 21, 2014, Claimant filed a Second Objection to the Record. A.R., p. 59. 
Claimant stated that the agency record was incomplete and that it should be augmented to include 
the following exhibits from hearing: Claimant's Exhibit G, Claimant's statement of Approximate 
Out-Of-Pocket Medical expenses. On March 18, 2014, the Industrial Commission filed an Order 
granting Claimant's Second Request to Augment the Agency Record. A.R., p. 61. 
On April 3, 2014, the Industrial Commission filed the Certification and Completion of the 
Record. A.R., p. 52-53. 
II. Course of the Proceedings Below 
Claimant filed a Worker's Compensation Complaint on August 5, 2009, for an injury 
sustained on May 1, 2006. On August 31, 2009, Defendants filed their Answer to Claimant's 
Complaint for the 2006 injury. Surety had paid out $7,768.75 in PPI benefits and $7,958.94 in 
medical benefits on Claimant's behalf for the May 1, 2006 injury. A.R., p. 1-5. 
The Commission conducted a hearing on November 13, 2012. A.R., p. 6. The noticed 
issues at hearing were: 
A. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided 
for by Idaho Code§ 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
B. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; and 
C. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) in excess of 
permanent impairment, and the extent thereo£ 
A.R., p. 6-7. The paiiies submitted post-hearing briefs and the Commission took the matter under 
advisement on June 4, 2013. A. R., p. 24. Based upon the records introduced at hearing and the 
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post-hearing briefing submitted by the parties, the Commission issued its Decision, dated June 19, 
2013. A.R., p. 6-24. The Commission specifically found the following: 
A. Claimant was medically stable on and after November 21, 2007 (MMI date); 
B. Claimant is not entitled to additional medical benefits beyond the MMI date; 
C. Claimant is not entitled to temporary disability benefits (TTD) or (TPD); 
D. Claimant is entitled to a permanent partial impairment (PPI) rating of 5% of the 
whole person; and 
E. Claimant is entitled to a permanent partial disability of 10%, inclusive of her 
permanent impairment. 
A.R., p. 25-26. On September 27, 2013, Claimant filed her Notice of Appeal with the Commission. 
A.R., p. 43. On October 18, 2013, Claimant filed her Notice of Appeal with the Idaho Supreme 
Court. A.R., p. 48. 
III. Statement of Facts 
A. Claimant's industrial accident and subsequent medical treatment 
Claimant was 57 years old at the time of hearing and a resident of Nampa, Idaho. Tr. 27:7-
10. She has a 12th grade education; however, she did not graduate. Def Ex. B, 4. On May 1, 2006, 
Claimant was working as a sales associate in the women's department at Macy's. Def Ex. A, 1. 
She was walking around the wrap stand when she tripped over the anti-fatigue mat. Id. Claimant 
landed forward with her left leg bent and initially felt pain in her elbows, hands, feet, knee, hips and 
back. Tr. 28: 12-20, 29: 1-2. Claimant was able to pick herself up off the ground but testified her 
whole body hurt. Tr. 29:9-16. Claimant did not report the incident to management until the next 
day. Tr. 29:21-22. 
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About two weeks later, Claimant met with manager Janet Snedigar who informed her that 
she needed to fill out an incident report. Tr. 30:9-11. It was noted in the record that the Employer 
was informed of the accident on May 16, 2006. Tr. 31 :5-8. Claimant testified she did not seek 
medical treatment right away because LeAnn Clayton, with whom she filled out the notice of injury, 
infonned Claimant that she did not think treatment would be covered. Tr. 31:18-20. Claimant 
decided to wait and see if the pain would get better, but three months later she had made no 
improvement and decided to seek treatment at Primary Health. Tr. 31:20-24. She had not missed 
any work at this point from her injury. Tr. 32:1-3. 
Claimant presented at Primary Health on August 31, 2006, indicating she had pain in her 
low back, left leg and hip. Ex. E, 46. She also reported pain in the left calf and toes. Id. at 50. She 
had no radiating pain and the nurse practitioner advised she follow-up with their occupational 
medicine department for further care. Id. at 46. In presenting with left sided back pain, Dr. 
Lossman felt she had a back strain with left sided sacroiliitis as well as sciatica of the left leg most 
likely secondary to a piriformis strain. Id. at 53-54. Claimant was referred to physical therapy 
where she was guarded and moved very slowly. Def Ex. G, 87. She felt like physical therapy only 
made her condition worse and chose not to continue. Tr. 32: 10-13. 
At the October 11, 2006, follow-up, Claimant reported little to no change in her condition. 
Def Ex. E, 58. She also reported her chronic fibromyalgia condition to be the reason it took her a 
long time to heal from the injury. Id. Dr. Lossman further opined that her low back strain was most 
likely work related, however, her reported chronic fibromyalgia was not. Id. As Claimant self-
reported that her condition continued to worsen, Dr. Lossman referred her to obtain an MRI. Def 
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Ex. E, 62. Dr. Lossman felt there was an L4-5 annular tear, but no disc herniation or impingement 
on the nerve roots. Tr. 44: 1-5; Def Ex. E, 65. Since there was no impingement, Dr. Lossman did 
"not have a total and direct cause of her sciatica." Id. 
Dr. Lossman referred Claimant to Dr. Nancy Greenwald where Claimant reported a 
longstanding history of fibromyalgia, cosmetic surgeries and the work-related injury with Macy's. 
Def Ex. F, 71. 1 Claimant also repo1ied pain from prior injuries including neck pain from a car 
accident 27 years ago, shoulder pain and back pain from when she slipped on ice. Tr. 44:8-14. 
Claimant noted she had a CAT scan in 2005 which showed a vertebra out of place. Def Ex. F, 71. 
This was a result of picking up her grandson the wrong way. Id. Claimant had been missing work 
because of pain, but Dr. Greenwald would not write a work excuse. Id. at 72. Claimant complained 
of her hip popping but Dr. Greenwald could not feel this during examination. Id. 
Claimant had an EMG study on January 9, 2007, which showed normal results, though there 
was some evidence of left LS radiculitis. Def Ex. D, 40. Dr. Greenwald advised Claimant to 
continue to attend physical therapy as she continued to have left buttock pain radiating into the left 
leg and foot. Def Ex. F, 75. She underwent a spinal evaluation on February 14, 2007, at Focus 
Physical Therapy and was given a home exercise program. Def Ex. G, 95. At follow-up in March, 
an epidural injection was suggested but Claimant declined. Def Ex. F, 7 6. Dr. Greenwald kept 
Claimant on a 25 pound lifting restriction, felt recovery was just slow going and was hopeful 
Claimant would not have any permanent impairment once healed. Id. 
1 Dr. Greenwald noted Claimant had a long history of fibromyalgia, however, at hearing Claimant testified she does not 
have fibromyalgia and never made such a statement. Tr. 43:4-12. 
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In April 2007, Claimant had new pain complaints of stabbing, nail-like pain in both anterior 
thighs. Def Ex. F, 77. She would also observe swelling in the left ankle. Id. Since Claimant 
consistently complained of left buttock pain with no improvement, Dr. Greenwald advised an MRJ. 
Id. The second MRI taken on May 24, 2007, showed "degenerative spondylitic changes L4-5 and 
L5-S l" and an L4-5 broad based disc bulge that had not significantly changed from the prior MRI. 
Def Ex. D, 41. There was also no evidence that the L5-S 1 disc protrusion had an effect on the S 1 
nerve roots. Id. 
After treating for almost a year with Dr. Greenwald, Claimant felt like she had made no 
improvement. Tr. 33:19-23. She returned to work in the san1e position; however, she would not 
work in the depaiiments with heavier items, such as rugs and mattresses. Tr. 37:19-23. Claimant 
testified Macy's had no problems accommodating the work restrictions. Tr. 38:12-13. She 
continued to work at her same hourly rate of $10.50 per hour until she voluntarily gave up her 
employment. Tr. 39:6-10. 
Claimant then sought treatment with Dr. Kevin Shea for her hip as well as numerous other 
physicians for her complaints. Tr. 34:9-20. Most physicians offered her the same treatment as 
received from Dr. Greenwald- medication and physical therapy. Tr. 34:21-25. 
Dr. Kevin Krafft met with Claimant for an independent medical examination on August 9, 
2007, where she reported having no prior injuries or conditions, though Dr. Krafft did note a history 
of fibromyalgia. Def Ex. H, 108, 115. Her main complaint was left hip pain, burning in the left 
ankle and cramping in the leg that gave a stabbing sensation. Id. at 111. She was able to sit without 
exhibiting pain throughout the exam, however, pain behavior was noted. Id. at 113. A normal gait 
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was seen though the pelvis was slightly asymmetrical when bending forward. Id. When given a 
pain diagram, Claimant's indications were suggestive of symptom magnification. Id. at 114. He 
did not feel Claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and recommended a trial of 
neuropathic pain medication. Id. at 116. He also advised additional manual physical therapy 
concentrating on Claimant's sacroiliac joint would be beneficial. Id. Regarding her work capacity, 
he felt light duty would be appropriate consisting of lifting up to 20 pounds on an occasional basis 
and to avoid bending, twisting and stooping. Id. 
A supplemental report was issued by Dr. Krafft on August 13, 2007, who felt Claimant's 
current symptoms were more likely than not, related to the fall she sustained at work. Ex. L 118. 
He also opined her pre-existing history of fibromyalgia was contributing to the long recovery 
period. Id. Dr. Greenwald agreed with his conclusions, however, did not think the recommended 
SI injection would be helpful. Def Ex. F, 82. Claimant also began to complain of new groin pain. 
Id. Dr. Greenwald suggested an x-ray of the left hip and pelvis and agreed with Hands On Physical 
Therapy's recommendations. Id. at 84. 
Claimant presented to Hands On Physical Therapy in late 2007, where she reported 
continuing left lumbar and gluteal pain. Def Ex. G, 102. She continued to tolerate stretching with a 
therapy ball well and was given cues for improved gait and gluteal control. Id. at 103. In October 
2007, she reported an increase in buttock, groin and ankle pain. Id. at 107. 
Claimant reported to Dr. Greenwald on November 2, 2007, tliat she was having worsening 
left buttock and left leg pain resulting from physical therapy. Def Ex. F, 85. Her low back pain 
was also worsening and starting to bum. Id. She had cramping in the left lower leg, worsening at 
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the end of the day, consistent pain in the left ankle, and groin pain still. Id. She had stopped 
physical therapy at Hands On because she did not feel like it was helping and requested an MRI or 
CAT scan. Id. Dr. Greenwald did not feel either of these was called for because her x-ray was 
normal. Id. Dr. Greenwald opined she had reached maximum medical improvement. Id. at 86. 
Despite Claimant's objections, Dr. Greenwald felt the only other alternative would be an epidural 
injection just to see if it would relieve any pain and possibly lead to the conclusion Claimant had S 1 
issues but Claimant "absolutely refused" the injection. Id. at 86. Permanent restrictions of no 
lifting more than 35 pounds and remaining at the medium work level were given. Id. A 5% whole 
person impairment was given. Id. Claimant was released from care. She did not agree with this 
decision. Tr. 49:3-7. 
Not happy with being released from care, Claimant followed-up with Dr. Schwartsman on 
June 26, 2008, at her then attorney's recommendation, as she had additional pain in her left leg and 
hip. Cl. Ex. F.2 After reviewing the MRI of Claimant's hip, Dr. Schwartsman felt her condition 
was not clinically symptomatic. Cl. Ex. F. He had no explanation for Claimant's continued pain 
complaints and only noted she did have pain which corresponded with mild/moderate arthritic 
changes seen in x-rays. Id. The labral tear in the hip remained asymptotic and surgical intervention 
would not be required to treat the injury. Id. He felt Claimant may be surgical regarding the lumbar 
condition based on her reports with physical examination, but would need to be evaluated by a 
qualified surgeon. Id. 
2 Although Claimant reported having left leg and hip pain, when she was asked to point to her area of pain, she 
indicated her lower lumbar region and sacroiliac joint. CL Ex. F. 
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Per Dr. Schwartsman's recommendation, Claimant met with Dr. Frizzell who felt she would 
benefit from a spinal cord stimulator and refened her to Dr. Sandra Thompson. Tr. 47:9-13. 
Claimant was then informed her spinal cord stimulator would not be approved through personal 
insurance. Dr. Frizzell stated that her ongoing symptoms were related to the May 1, 2006, fall. Cl. 
Ex. F. In a retum visit to Dr. Frizzell on January 8, 2009, exacerbation of Claimant's pain was 
reported from using the stimulator. Id. He felt Claimant would possibly benefit from a diskogram 
to figure out what level of the spine her pain was emanating from. Id. Claimant was advised to 
return to treating with Dr. Thompson. Id. After the diskogram was completed, Claimant felt her 
pain decreased for about a day and a half. Tr. 48:1-2. In October 2009, Dr. Thompson referred 
Claimant to meet with Dr. Thomas Manning who recommended updated imaging. Cl. Ex. F. He 
also recommended an MRI of the cervical spine since she had neck pain complaints. Id. Dr. 
Manning was concerned about her fibromyalgia and the possibility of a Chiari malfom1ation. Id. 
Claimant continued to work for Macy's following the accident until November 2008, when 
she complained the pain was too bad to continue working. Def Ex. B, 6. She then took short term 
disability beginning at the end of November 2008. Id. When her short term disability expired, she 
took a personal leave of absence which began April 22, 2009. Id. at 5. She reported to Macy's that 
at this point she could still not walk long enough to work. Id. She also reported being unable to 
take pain pills due to her bladder cystitis. Id. at 9. 
Cunently, Claimant says she cannot stand up straight without feeling a shooting pain go 
down into her leg. Tr. 35: 16-17. She says that if she continuously bends over, her back begins to 
ache and causes a migraine. Tr. 35:17-19. Since quitting her employment with Macy's, Claimant 
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has not looked for work outside of babysitting her grandchild. Tr. 40:8-12. Today, her pain is 
worse than it was in 2007. Tr. 50:8-10. 
B. Testimony of Rick Shubert 
Claimant's husband, Rick Shubert, testified at hearing that Claimant still cooks dinner while 
her husband does the housework. Tr. 52:20-21. She will sometimes visit her husband while he is 
on his work break, however, she doesn't like to drive much because it hurts to tum her neck. Tr. 
53:2-4. During the day, Claimant watches her five-year-old grandson. Tr. 55:21-23. She usually 
fixes him lunch, watches old movies with him and lets him play in the back yard. Tr. 55:24-56:2. 
Claimant's daughter pays $12.50 per day for babysitting. Tr. 56:9-12. Mr. Shubert felt that 
Claimant is "most all the time (she) is suffering from pain." Tr. 5 3: 18-19. 
IV. Issues Presented on Appeal 
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A. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found Claimant was at MMI on 
November 21, 2007. 
B. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found Claimant was 
entitled to additional medical benefits beyond the MMI date of November 
21, 2007. 
C. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found Claimant is not entitled to 
temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits. 
D. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found that Claimant is not 
entitled to total permanent disability. 
E. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found Claimant was able to enter the 
labor market post hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Relevant Law 
A. Medical Benefits 
A claimant must provide medical testimony that supports a claim for compensation to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability. Langley v. State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P. 2d 732 (1995). That a claimant suffers a covered injury to a 
particular part of his body does not make the employer liable for all future medical treatment 
related to that part of the body, even if such medical care is reasonable. Henderson v. McCain 
Foods, 142 Idaho 559,563, 130 P.3d 1097, 1101 (2006). 
The Court in Sprague outlines three circumstances that must be presented for an employer 
to pay for an employee's continued medical treatment after maximum medical improvement has 
been detem1ined. Sprague v. Caldwell Transp., Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 721, 779 P.2d 395,396 (1989). 
These circumstances are: 
a) the claimant made gradual improvement from the treatment received; b) the 
treatment was required by the claimant's physician; and c) the treatment received 
was within the physicians standard of practice the charges for which were fair, 
reasonable and similar to charges in the same profession. Id. 
B. Time Loss Benefits 
Idaho Code § 72-408 states, in pertinent part, "Income benefits for total and partial 
disability during the period of recovery ... shall be paid to the disabled employee subject to 
deduction on account of waiting period and subject to the maximum and minimum limits set 
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forth in section 72-409, Idaho Code." (Emphasis added.) While it is clear such benefits are 
mandatory, it is equally clear those benefits are mandatory only during the period of recovery. 
Once a claimant is declared medically stable, she is no longer in "the period of recovery," and 
total temporary benefits cease to be owed. Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Ctr., 136 Idaho 579, 586, 
38 P.3d 617, 624 (2001), citing Loya v. JR. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho 62, 813 P.2d 873 (1991), 
Harrison v. Osco Drug, Inc., 116 Idaho 470, 776 P.2d 1189 (1989), and Paulson v. Idaho Forest 
Indus., Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 591 P.2d 143 (1979). 
C. Permanent Partial Impairment 
Permanent impairment is an anatomic or functional abnormality or loss after maximal 
medical rehabilitation has been achieved and a claimant's position is considered medically 
stable. Henderson v. McCain Foods, 142 Idaho 559, 567, 130 P.3d 1097, 1105 (2006), citing 
LC. § 72-422. Evaluation of PPI is a medical appraisal of the nature and extent of an injury as it 
affects a claimant's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living. When determining 
impairment, the opinions of physicians are advisory only because the Commission is the ultimate 
evaluator. Urry v. Walker & Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 
1127 (1989). 
D. Permanent Partial Disability 
"Disability" is defined in Idaho as "a decrease in wage-earning capacity due to injury or 
occupational disease, as such capacity is affected by the medical factor of physical impairment, 
and by pertinent nonmedical factors." McCabe v. JoAnn Stores, Inc., 145 Idaho 91, 96, 175 P.3d 
780, 785 (2007); see also Davidson v. Riverland Excavating, 147 Idaho 339, 209 P.3d 636, 642 
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(2009). The test for detem1ining whether a claimant has suffered a pennanent disability greater 
than permanent impairment is "whether the physical impairment, taken in conjunction with non-
medical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment." Graybill v. Swift 
& Co., 115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). The primary purpose of PPD is "to 
compensate the claimant for his loss of earning capacity or his reduced ability to engage in 
gainful activity." Ruiz v. Blaine Oarsen Farms, Inc. and Ins. Co. of the West, IC 99-023870, ,r 
13 (April 26, 2006), citing Baldner v. Bennett, 103 Idaho 458, 649 P.2d 1241 (1982). 
Disability generally has two components: loss of access to the labor market and loss of 
earning capacity. Davidson v. Riverland Excavating, Inc. IC 2000-001963, ,l 61 (September 7, 
2007). The burden of proof is on a claimant to prove disability in excess of impairment. 
McCabe, 145 Idaho at 96, 175 P.3d at 785 (holding claimant did not meet her burden), citing 
Bennett v. Clark Hereford Ranch, 106 Idaho 438, 440, P.2d 539, 541 (1984). If a claimant does 
not present significant evidence of PPD, "an additional award in excess of the impairment may 
not be sustained." McCabe, 145 Idaho at 96, 175 P.3d at 758; see also Graybill, 115 Idaho at 
294, 766 P.2d at 764. The determination of disability is a question of fact left to the discretion of 
the Commission. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 (2002). 
II. Standard of Review 
A. Factual Determinations 
When the Supreme Court reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, it exercises 
free review over questions of law but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether 
substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Vawter v. United 
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Parcel Service, Inc., P.3d, 2014 WL 497437, Idaho (2014) (citing Ogden v. Thompson, 128 
Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996)). Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to supp01t a conclusion." Id., (citing Boise 
Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161, 164, 191 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). The 
Commission's conclusions on the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless 
the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Id. The Commission's decision below turns solely upon 
questions of fact. 
On appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court grants 
great deference to the Commission's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. This Court 
exercises free review over questions oflaw, but not over questions of fact. As restated in Sundquist 
v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450, 111 P.3d 135 (2005): 
When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free 
review over questions oflaw. Uhl v. Ballard Medical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 
657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003) ... The factual findings of the Industrial 
Commission will be upheld provided they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Uhl, 138 Idaho at 657, 67 P.3d at 1269. "Substantial and 
competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion." Id. The conclusions reached by the Industrial Commission 
regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the 
conclusions are clearly erroneous. Hughen v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349,351, 
48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002). We will not re-weigh the evidence or consider whether 
we would have drawn a different conclusion from the evidence presented. 
Id., (emphasis added). "[Substantial and competent evidence] is more than a scintilla of proof, but 
less than a preponderance.'' Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 48, P.3d 545, 549 (2007) (Internal 
quotations and citations omitted). The Commission is the ultimate judge of credibility of witnesses. 
Duncan v. Navajo Trucldng, 134 Idaho 202, 204; 998 P .2d 1115, 1117 (2000). It is a function of 
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the Commission and not of this Court to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be 
assigned testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record as a whole. 
ASARCO, Inc., v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 127 Idaho 928, 931, 908 P.2d 1235, 1238 
(1996). 
III. Contentions of the Respondents 
A. Construing the Evidence of Record in a Light Most Favorable to 
Respondents, the Commission's Factual Determination Below that 
Claimant was at MMI on November 21, 2007 is Supported by Substantial 
and Credible Evidence 
Claimant reported to Dr. Greenwald on November 2, 2007, asserting that she was having 
worsening left buttock and left leg pain resulting from physical therapy. Def Ex. F, 85. Her low 
back pain was also worsening and starting to burn. Id. She had cramping in the left lower leg, 
worsening at the end of the day, consistent pain in the left ankle, and groin pain still. Id. She had 
stopped physical therapy at Hands On because she did not feel like it was helping and requested an 
MRI or CAT scan. Id. Dr. Greenwald did not feel either of these were called for because her x-ray 
was normal. Id. On November 21, 2007, Dr. Greenwald opined she had reached maximum 
medical improvement. Id. at 86. Dr. Greenwald felt the only other alternative for Claimant's 
ongoing pain would be epidural injections to see if it would relieve any pain and possibly lead to the 
conclusion Claimant had S 1 issues but Claimant "absolutely refused" the injection. Id. at 86. 
Claimant's refusal to adhere to Dr. Greenwald's recommendations for epidural 
steroid injections and to stop attending her physical therapy sessions with Hands On was a choice 
she made on her own. The doctor's recommendations may have ultimately alleviated Claimant's 
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pain issues. As a result of Claimant's refusal of recommendation, Dr. Greenwald opined that 
additional options for Claimant's pain had been exhausted. On November 21, 2007, Dr. Greenwald 
opined Claimant had reached Maximum Medical hnprovement (MMI). There was no contrary 
contemporary medical evidence on this issue, and even if there were, the Commission is free to 
detennine which medical evidence to give weight to. 
The Industrial Commission made no error in opining Claimant had reached MMI on 
November 21, 2007. Substantial evidence supported this finding. Def Ex. F, 86. 
B. The Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Denying 
Claimant Medical Benefits Beyond the MMI Date of November 21, 2007 is 
Supported by Substantial and Credible Evidence 
On November 21, 2007, Dr. Greenwald opined Claimant had reached maximum medical 
improvement. Def Ex. F, 86. The court in Sprague outlines three circumstances that must be 
presented for an employer to pay for an employee's continued medical treatment after maximum 
medical improvement has been determined. Sprague v. Caldwell Transp., Inc., 116 Idal10 720, 721, 
779 P.2d 395,396 (1989). These circumstances are: 
a) the claimant made gradual improvement from the treatment received; b) the 
treatment was required by the claimant's physician; and c) the treatment received 
was within the physicians standard of practice the charges for which were fair, 
reasonable and similar to charges in the same profession. Id. 
Claimant directly refused the recommendations of Dr. Greenwald. It was the doctor's opinion that 
all that could be done to alleviate Claimant's pain had been exhausted and that as a result, no further 
treatment was deemed necessary. The Commission agreed with the opinion of Dr. Greenwald. 
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None of Claimant's post MMI treatment was ever opined as reasonable or necessary by physicians 
- they were only suggested as options since Claimant continued to present with pain complaints. 
None of the objective medical evidence ever supported her pain complaints. 
In Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet and Supply, the claimant made no improvement in condition 
and therefore he was not entitled to further medical benefits. 124 Idaho 294, 298, 859 P.2d 330, 334 
(1993). The Court upheld the Industrial Commission decision that no additional payments were 
required. Id. In the current situation, as Claimant continued to undergo treatment, there was no 
substantial evidence showing Claimant was benefitting from continued care. Claimant admitted 
numerous times in hearing testimony that the additional treatment did not help her condition. 
On May 23, 2007, over a year after the reported industrial injury, Dr. Greenwald was still 
unable to see why Claimant continued to experience pain. Def Ex. F, 78. Claimant continued to 
report her condition was worsening even though additional MRI's showed no change in Claimant's 
condition. A May 24, 2007, MRI showed no changes and no impingement on any neural structures. 
Def Ex. D, 41.3 At this point, Claimant had completed all recommended treatment suggested to 
her. She made no improvements and there was no diagnostic or objective medical evidence to 
warrant additional treatment or support her claims of increasing pain. Dr. Greenwald spent almost 
a year trying to find the source of Claimant's pain. By the end of treatment, she could not find any 
way to make Claimant feel better despite numerous treatment options and courses of physical 
therapy. Def Ex. F, 86. 
3 Only degenerative changes were seen on films. Def. Ex. D, 41. 
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The extent of Claimant's injury was a question of medical causation that was not addressed 
by any of the post-stability medical information offered by the Claimant at hearing. The fact 
Claimant is subjectively symptomatic did not require the Commission to determine she is entitled 
to additional medical benefits. Continued medical care offered no improvement in Claimant's 
condition. Claimant did not complete physical therapy as she felt treatment worsened her condition. 
From the beginning of treatment, Claimant changed physicians on multiple occasions due to being 
offered the same course of treatment but not experiencing any results. The Commission indicates in 
its Order Denying Reconsideration that they considered the conflicting medical evidence, including 
that of Dr. Frizzell, ultimately finding the opinion of Dr. Greenwald the most persuasive. In his 
report, Dr. Schwaitsman noted she had been offered multiple steroid injections but declined. Cl. Ex. 
F. Physical examination, diagnostic reports and previous chart notes from other physicians offered 
no support that Claimant had any objective evidence of discomfort. Although Schwartsman was 
concerned there might be an issue at L4-5 and L5-S 1 the Commission made a factual finding that 
Dr. Greenwald correctly found that further treatment/resting would not be efficacious. This finding 
is supported by substantial and competent evidence and it is not the job of this Court to reweigh the 
medical evidence on this point. 
Simply because Claimant did not present to medical providers pre injury does not mean she 
did not experience pain prior to the fall. Many medical records report Claimant has extensive 
degenerative changes in the lumbar spine and left hip. Not a single physician has issued a medical 
opinion on why Claimant's symptoms have continued to increase despite negative testing results 
and no objective medical evidence to support her reports. 
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Dr. Krafft opined Claimant had a perceived level of severe disability, not an actual 
disability. Def Ex. H, 115. She denied her fibromyalgia condition during her appointment with Dr. 
Krafft, though throughout other medical records, she seems to have experienced slowness in healing 
time due to this condition, which she personally denies. Regarding Claimant's aithritic changes, Dr. 
Schwartsman opined she was not a surgical candidate. Cl. Ex. F. Dr. Manning was "perplexed" by 
the fact Claimant only had one day of relief with the hip injection. Id. 
Not a single physician has ever opined Claimant is surgical. Further, none have 
recommended significantly different treatment or a "new" course for Claimant to try. Once she 
completed her time with one physician, she would begin care with another in hopes of finding some 
"miracle" cure for her condition, a condition that itself is not entirely clear but that appears to be 
unrelated to the subject fall. Defendants are not responsible for post medical stability medical care 
where Claimant did not obtain approval for this treatment by any of the three recognized methods 
i.e. referral from within the chain, approval of surety, or petition to the IC for change of physician. 
See, Robinson v. Frazier Indus. Co., IC 2003-013319; 2008 WL 3926758 (2008). Claimant asserts 
that a former attorney of hers sought approval from the surety for a second orthopedic opinion but 
this was denied by surety and no petition for change of physician was ever filed with the 
Commission. Claimant did not adequately prove causation with regard to any of her post stability 
medical treatment. Therefore, the Commission made no error by denying Claimant medical 
benefits beyond the MMI date ofNovember 21, 2007. 
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C. The Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Denying 
Claimant Additional Temporary Total or Temporary Partial Disability 
Benefits are Supported by Substantial and Credible Evidence 
Based on the Commission's agreement on the date of MMI, Claimant is not entitled to any 
additional temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits. Despite Claimant's efforts to 
seek additional treatment after the date of MMI, the Commission found "none of these records are 
sufficient to challenge Dr. Greenwald's determination that Claimant reached a point of medical 
stability." A.R., p. 27. While it is undisputed Claimant later treated with a number of physicians, 
none of them opined she was in a "period of recovery," took her off work, or offered additional 
restrictions. 
Claimant was given restrictions while working as a sales clerk. Tr. 37:3-6. Dr. Greenwald 
encouraged Claimant to return to work and not to miss any time. Def Ex. F, 73. Instead of abiding 
by the direction of her physicians, Claimant appears to have determined what she felt her work 
status should be by informing Macy's what she could and could not do. Throughout follow-up 
appointments, Claimant reported she continued to work her usual 32 hour work week. 
There is no medical evidence supporting Claimant's contention she is entitled to additional 
TTD benefits. The Commission made no error by denying Claimant additional temporary total or 
temporary partial disability benefits. 
D. The Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Denying 
Claimant a Permanent Partial Impairment Rating Above 5% of the Whole 
Person is Supported by Substantial and Credible Evidence 
Claimant reached MMI on November 21, 2007. Dr. Greenwald assessed a permanent 
partial impairment rating of 5% of the whole person due to Claimant's difficulty with daily 
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activities and work. Her opinion was based on the Fifth Edition of the AMA Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment Lumbar Spine Category IL In November of 2007, she opined 
that claimant had an 8% whole person impainnent but that 3% of that was related to pre existing or 
unrelated arthritis. Defendants paid the 5% final impairment rating as opined by Dr. Greenwald. 
Dr. Greenwald provided medical care over a significant amount of time, much of which 
Claimant refused or simply failed to follow-up on. Ultimately, Dr. Greenwald placed Claimant 
at MMI because she believed that no further treatment would improve her condition. A. R., p. 
19. Dr. Greenwald was the only physician to assess a PPI rating - Claimant has produced no 
competing medical opinion from which any other assessment could be determined. Dr. 
Greenwald's PPI rating was adopted by the Commission. It is well recognized that the 
Commission is the ultimate determiner of impairment as medical opinions are simply opinions to be 
considered by the Commission. The Commission made no error by denying Claimant an additional 
permanent partial impairment rating above 5% of the whole person. 
E. The Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Denying 
Claimant Permanent Ongoing Disability Benefits are Supported by 
Substantial and Credible Evidence 
The issue of permanent disability benefits is a question of fact for the Commission. 
Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 (2002). Claimant wants the Court 
to consider the medical opinion of Social Security physician Dr. John Casper that Claimant 
should not lift more than 25 lbs. and would have difficulty with prolonged standing and walking 
due to her low back pain. This opinion only goes to the issue of restrictions and not to the 
Commission's overall evaluation of Claimant's loss of access and retained ability to return to the 
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work force. Claimant did not present any evidence from any expert regarding disability in 
excess of impainnent. Contrary to Claimant's argument, a detem1ination of disability is not 
based on a medical evaluation, as medical opinions generally establish what a Claimant's 
residual functional capacity is, and vocational experts determine how that loss of function results 
in a loss of access to the marketplace. The Commission found that Claimant did not supply any 
such expert evidence. The Commission appropriately considered Claimant's 12th grade 
education, her writing and verbal skills, as well as her level of articulation and organization. 
A.R.,p. 17. 
Claimant was employed as a sales clerk at the time of her accident and injury at $10.50 per 
hour. This job involved ringing up sales, cleaning fitting rooms, hanging clothes, and lifting of 
items including toaster ovens, coffeemakers, mixers, and bedding. When she returned to work post 
medical stability, Claimant was informed by Dr. Greenwald not to lift over 35 pounds on a 
occasional basis, 20 pounds frequently, and 10 pounds continually. Def Ex. F, 86b. Based on the 
medical evidence along with the physical restrictions given by Dr. Greenwald, the Commission 
found Claimant was entitled to 10% permanent partial disability, inclusive of her permanent 
impairment. 
The burden of proof is on a claimant to prove disability in excess of impairment. 
McCabe, 145 Idaho at 96, 175 P .3d at 785 (holding claimant did not meet her burden), citing 
Bennett v. Clark Hereford Ranch, 106 Idaho 438,440, P.2d 539, 541 (1984). The determination 
of disability is a question of fact left to the discretion of the Commission. Eacret v. Clearwater 
Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 (2002). Claimant argues that the Commission should 
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have relied upon the determination by the Social Security Administration that she was totally 
disabled. This evidence does not establish total and permanent disability under the Idaho 
Worker's Compensation Law. The Social Secmity system has its own laws and rules which 
differ from the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law. A major touchstone for the Social Security 
system is whether Claimant can perform "substantial gainful activity." Idaho Worker's 
Compensation Law analyzes whether Claimant is 100% totally and permanently disabled, that is, 
unable to engage in any activity worthy of compensation. See, Arnold v. Splendid Bakery, 88 
Idaho 455,463,401 P.2d 271,276 (1965). Idaho Worker's Compensation Law analyzes 
claimant's ability to perform work and to compete for jobs in the labor market. Under Social 
Security rules, "substantial gainful activity" is defined by a threshold of income, not physical 
exertion, capacity, nor labor market competitiveness. The focus and criteria by which the 
systems determine disability is entirely different. 
Idaho Worker's Compensation Law looks to a claimant's ability to perform work and to 
compete for jobs in the labor market. The Social Security system looks to a claimant's income. 
The Commission made findings that are supported by substantial and competent evidence with 
regard to claimant's ability to perform work and to compete for jobs in the labor market. 
The Commission did not error by denying Claimant a permanent partial disability rating 
above 10% of the whole person. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents submit that Claimant filed her Appeal to the Supreme Court solely based 
upon her disagreement with the Commission's determination of the weight given to the facts 
presented and conclusions drawn from those facts, rather than upon legal error. The issue here is 
one of fact, i.e., whether there was substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's 
finding. In essence Claimant has asked the Court to do nothing more than reweigh the evidence 
and come to a different conclusion, one that is favorable to the Claimant this time. Duncan v. 
Navajo, 134 Idaho 202, 998 P.2d 1115 (2000). "[The Court] does not try the matter anew." 
Wichterman v. JH Kelly, Inc., 144 Idaho 138, 158 P.3d 301, 303 (2007). The Commission 
committed no error in not allowing records from Claimant's Social Security proceeding whose 
standard of detem1ining disability is entirely distinct from the standard set by Idaho's workers 
compensation statues. 
Respondents respectfully pray that this Court not disturb the Commission's findings of 
facts as they are not erroneous and are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
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Respectfully submitted this i-+!:: day of July, 2014. ---
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